



OFFICIAL-INFORMAL  
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UNITED STATES MISSION  
TO THE  
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION  
AND EUROPEAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS  
(USRO)

This document consists of ..... 2 ..... pages  
Number ..... of ..... 7 ..... copies, Series .....

2 RUE ST. FLORENTIN  
PARIS 1, FRANCE

June 26, 1958

Dear Jacques:

Many thanks for your letter of June 17, with the very interesting enclosures. You have certainly been fighting the good fight.

As you requested in our last phone call, I am sending you my thoughts by letter, particularly as we now have a little turn-around time.

I remain disturbed about the treatment of the idea of not moving non-German Western forces into the East zone. I think your present formulation of tying this to the assurance regarding Article 8 in the event Germany opts for NATO is an ingenious improvement. But it doesn't deal with the fact that the result would be to bar US nuclear custodial units necessary under the stockpile plan from the East zone.

This worries me because of the following:

(1) I'm sure this will be spotted, and will create problems for us in Germany. Some Germans may well say that they need the best weapons up front.

(2) The Russians are almost certainly going to reject our plan anyway. Therefore, we should not put forward something which really impairs the status quo under which we will have to continue to live, if it is at all possible to avoid doing so.


(3) Once the idea of Western acceptance of a de-facto de-nuclearized zone is out in public, I think the pressures for a Rapacki Plan set-up would be irresistible. No distinction convincing to the man in the street could be drawn between the "before reunification" and "after reunification" situations.

Therefore, I urge that the last sentence of point 3 of the memo to the Secretary (drafting date, June 16) should be amended to read along the following lines:

"In addition

Jacques Reinstein, Esquire,  
Director, Office of German Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington 25, D.C.

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
"In addition, it is proposed to add to the assurances to be given by the Western Powers in the event of Germany joining NATO, an undertaking that military personnel of the Western Powers other than Germany would not exceed 500."

On another point, can we assume that the last sentence of the 2nd paragraph of point 4 does not mean that the Morstad Plan is permanently shelved? Are we intentionally holding it back? I think we should, for the moment, but just wish to remind you that it will take a little preliminary missionary work to sell to our allies.

Fritz Nolting agrees with the foregoing.

Please let me know what you think of this.

Sincerely,

  
Joseph J. Wolf  
Director, Office of Political Affairs

Copies to:

R. L. Thurston  
W. Stoessel  
R. McBride

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